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Abstract
In light of increasing numbers of women in politics, extant research has examined the role
of women in the parliamentary party on agenda-setting. This paper complements that literature
by exploring the effect of a gendered institution theorized to promote both numbers of women
and awareness of women’s interests: gender quota laws. I suggest that after a quota law, parties
could have incentives to either reduce (backlash effect) or increase (salience effect) attention
to women’s policy concerns. Using matching and regression methods with a panel dataset
of parties in advanced democracies, I find that parties in countries that implement a quota
law devote more attention to social justice issues in their manifestos than similar parties in
countries without a quota. Further, the paper shows that this effect is driven entirely by the
law itself. Contrary to expectations, quota laws are not associated with increases in women
in my (short-term) sample; it is thus no surprise that no evidence of an indirect effect through
numbers of women is found. I interpret the findings as evidence of quota contagion, whereby
quotas cue party leaders to compete on gender equality issues.
∗Thanks to Peter Allen, Lisa Baldez, Amanda Clayton, Jennifer Hochschild, Nahomi Ichino, Torben Iversen, Miki
Kittilson, Sparsha Saha, Øyvind Skorge, Pär Zetterberg, and participants of workshops at Harvard University for helpful
comments and suggestions.
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I had to fight to have a chapter in the program for instance. For gender equality...I
wrote it, and then I presented it, there were no questions, no one made any comments.
And it was one of the texts since the beginning everybody said, OK, that text is OK.
So after that I had to proofread it myself to see if there were any mistakes or so on. I
don’t think anybody read it.
–Viviane Teitelbaum
Belgian politician (MR)1
The issues of inequality are now a political problem. Even people of the right wing
that didn’t agree with the [quota] law, they now talk about the effects, how they will
affect women, of several measures that are adopted by the government.
–Maria de Belém
Portuguese politician (PS)2
Do gender quota laws matter to parties’ policy agendas, and if so how? As the channels
that link a people to a government, political parties are perhaps the most important mechanism
of representation (Sartori 2005). Decisions about party priorities set the bounds for future policy
change. Recent examples are illustrative: in the U.S., President Obama fulfilled his party’s
campaign pledge to reform health care with the passage of the Affordable Care Act. In the U.K.,
the Conservative party promised to hold a referendum on whether to leave the E.U. and respect the
outcome, and they have. While not deterministic (more on this later), party positions matter.
Previous literature suggests that environmental factors like public opinion, ideology, and
organizational structure are the most important determinants of party priorities. Recently, several
authors have contributed to this literature by demonstrating the significant role of descriptive
representation, women in the party (Kittilson 2011; O’Brien 2012; Greene & O’Brien 2016).
Gender quota laws are electoral laws or constitutional provisions requiring all parties to include a
certain percentage of women in their party lists. This is the first study to address the link between
quotas and party priorities. The contribution of this study is to address two key questions: 1) do
parties change their priorities after a quota law is implemented, and 2) is the effect of a quota law
1Personal interview, Brussels, Belgium, 23 October 2013.
2Personal interview, Lisbon, Portugal, 7 November 2013.
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independent from the effect of additional numbers of women?
The distinction between quotas and women is not trivial, and there are reasons to believe
quotas could either dampen or reinforce the representation of women’s policy priorities. On the
positive side (salience effect), quotas can change the political culture to bemore accepting of women
in politics, in both parliaments (Galligan, Clavero & Calloni 2007; Burnet 2011; Xydias 2014) and
among the general public (Beaman et al. 2008). They can also leadwomen elected via a quota to feel
they have a mandate to act ‘for’ women, making them especially likely to support women’s policy
interests (Franceschet & Piscopo 2008). On the negative side (backlash effect), quotas might also
lead to women elected via a quota feeling stigmatized and avoiding women’s issues (Franceschet
& Piscopo 2008) and there is a fear of resentful male politicians trying to prevent ‘quota women’
from exercising political power (Hawkesworth 2003; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer & Taylor-Robinson
2005). In light of this, can and will women elected after a quota act to pursue women’s interests?
Will (predominantly male) party leaders act differently with regards to women’s interests?
This paper provides the first cross-country evidence that quota laws affect party agendas.
While the question of whether other types of quotas like internal party quotas also lead to change
is interesting, for the sake of this paper I focus on laws. This is because the imposition of quotas
on parties that did not support them offers a good context to explore causal effects, using party
level data. The imposition of a national level law might also shift the national debate and public
opinion in ways that a party quota does not. I consider the possibility of positive and negative
effects of a quota law on three positions characterized by a gender gap in preferences in advanced
democracies: 1) social justice, 2) welfare state expansion, and 3) left-right position. To better
understand the mechanisms driving the results, I conduct mediation analysis to tease apart direct
and indirect effects; that is, effects of the law itself versus those channeled through women in the
party. The quotations from interviews with politicians above indicate that after a quota, women
might be better able to exercise power over the party program (as in the Teitelbaum quote) and
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party leaders might be more likely to see gender equality as a ‘political problem’ that they can no
longer ignore (de Belém).
To test this argument I analyze party positions as set out in manifestos, which come from
the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR; Budge 2001; Klingemann 2006; Volkens et al.
2016). Studying the causal effects of quota laws is difficult because quotas are not randomized,
and countries that pass a quota (or parties that propose one) could differ from those that do not. To
deal with this issue, I use statistical matching to match parties in countries that adopt a quota law to
parties in countries that do not. Matching improves balance in the data set, reducing the dependence
of the findings on statisticalmodelling assumptions. I then use this pruned data inmodels employing
a difference-in-difference approach, which compares ‘treated’ parties in countries that get a quota
law to ‘control’ parties that do not. As a robustness check, I remove parties that proposed the quota
law, so that for the parties remaining the quota law can be seen as an exogenous change imposed
on the party. The pruned data includes 40 parties in 16 countries from 1969 to 2011. I also show
that results are similar using regression without matching.
I find no evidence of a backlash effect, and support for increased salience to some of
women’s policy concerns after a quota. Quotas increase party attention to social justice, but not
welfare state expansion or the party’s overall left-right position. Quota laws lead to a sizable 5.6
percentage point increase in party attention to social justice; i.e., a party that spent 10% of its
manifesto discussing social justice would be expected to spend 15.6% of its manifesto on social
justice after a quota law is implemented. The effect is driven entirely by the law itself. Contrary
to common assumptions, I find no evidence that quotas increased numbers of women within the
parties in my short-term sample. It is thus unsurprising that I also find no evidence of an indirect
effect through numbers of women. I interpret these findings as evidence for quota ‘contagion’ on
gender equality policies. After a quota law, parties increase competition on gender equality issues
in order to target or retain women voters.
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The paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature on party agendas and gender.
I then propose two sets of hypotheses linking quotas and policy change, focusing on the direction
of the effect and causal mediation. I test these claims using party manifesto data. The results
present consistent evidence that quotas shift party attention to social justice issues, and that the
(short-term) effect is direct rather than mediated by women. I conclude by discussing quotas as not
only outcomes in the political process, but also important instigators of attitudes and behavior.
Quotas, Women, and Party Priorities
Party positions, as set out in manifestos, represent an early but crucial stage in the policy process:
where the agenda is set. The manifesto provides a program for the winning party to follow and be
held accountable for once in office. While parties are not bound by the contents of the manifesto,
generally behavior in office correlates with manifesto promises (Klingemann et al. 1994; Walgrave,
Varone & Dumont 2006; Mansergh & Thomson 2007; Naurin 2014). Previous work suggests
that parties are more likely to keep their campaign pledges when they have more control over the
government, but even parties in opposition can fulfill pledges (Thomson et al. 2012). Manifesto
decisions are significant not just for the party’s electoral success, but because they dictate the
topics of political debate in a society. They have important implications for the quality of political
representation afforded to women (and other groups). I focus on advanced democracies in this study
because my theory is based on gender differences in policy preferences, which are well-established
in developed democracies but not elsewhere. I also note that investigating party-level policy change
is important in this context of generally strong parties, but would not be as relevant in countries
where parties are weak.
Existing scholarship suggests that parties change their positions in response to environ-
mental factors, such as shifts in public opinion (Adams et al. 2004, 2006;McDonald &Budge 2005;
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Ezrow 2007), economic conditions (Adams, Haupt & Stoll 2009; Haupt 2010; Burgoon 2012), and
how the party did in the last election (Somer-Topcu 2009). Thus far, only a handful of studies
have focused on the impact of women on party positions, and no study has considered the role of
gender quotas. Notably, Kittilson (2011) finds that the share of women and women’s organizations
in the party are associated with increased attention to social justice, but not welfare or education, in
party platforms. More recently, Greene and O’Brien (2016) find that parties with greater shares of
women are associated with increased diversity of issues in the manifesto, and tend to shift leftward.
Informed by this literature, the main contribution of this study is to measure the effect of quotas,
rather than gender, on party priorities.
It is often difficult to distinguish quotas from gender; quota laws typically apply to all
candidates, for example (Franceschet, Krook&Piscopo 2012; Hughes, Paxton&Krook 2017). Yet,
several studies have made progress on this question using natural experiments or methodological
advances. For example, in their work on quotas and qualifications Weeks and Baldez (2015) use a
unique institutional setup in Italy whereby the quota law applied to only one part of the electoral
system to distinguish quotas from women. In a study of party leadership, O’Brien and Rickne
(2016) use a natural experiment in Sweden whereby the quota was imposed by the national party
on local branches, impacting numbers of women in some branches more than others. Continuing
in this vein, this study endeavors to assess quota effects on party priorities. Below, I build on the
literature on gender quotas and critical mass theory to suggest two alternative hypotheses: quotas
might have either a salience effect or a backlash effect.
Quota laws apply to all political parties in a country, theoretically leading to an increase
in women that is more balanced across parties than typical ‘organic’ growth (which tends to be
driven by parties on the left). If women’s interests transcend party – and many studies find that
gender gaps in policy preferences persist even within parties (Poggione 2004; Barnes & Cassese
2017), then the quota opens up a wider group of parties to change. Quotas also lead to greater
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numbers of women in leadership positions (O’Brien & Rickne 2016), and party leaders typically
have a great deal of influence on the agenda and encourage other women to participate (Blumenau
2017). The women elected via a quota might also feel a particular ‘mandate’ to act for women
(Franceschet & Piscopo 2008; Childs & Krook 2012). Finally, as I discuss in more detail below,
by raising the issue of gender equality in politics to the national stage, quota laws can also shift
political culture, encouraging more attention to gender equality concerns. Thus, quotas might lead
to better representation of women’s interests:
H1a: Salience effect: Quotas increase party attention to women’s policy priorities.
The opposite might also be true: quotas might elicit a backlash among those who disagree
with their imposition. Increasing numbers of women may prompt resistance from the traditional
majority, men. According to ‘intrusiveness’ theory (Blalock 1967), when minorities like women
in politics are small in number they are perceived to be nonthreatening. As minority numbers
grow, majority groups are more likely to feel threatened and react negatively (see also Krook
2015). Quotas might cause particular consternation because they necessitate men being replaced
by women, rather than simply increasing numbers of women. We see early examples of quota
resistance in the creative loopholes that parties find to avoid implementing a quota within their
party (e.g., Baldez 2007; Fréchette, Maniquet & Morelli 2008).
Quota scholarship also suggests that resistance can persist after the quota law successfully
increases numbers of women. In Uganda, for example, women from reserved seats are less likely
to be recognized in debate compared to their male and female colleagues elected via open seats
(Clayton, Josefsson & Wang 2014). A survey of Flemish politicians a decade after the first quota
law passed reveals men and women have polar opposite views on the legitimacy of quotas in politics
and their effects on candidate quality (Meier 2008). This kind of resentment could easily bleed into
formal and informal party rules and behavior. In a study of parties in Catalonia, Verge and de la
Fuente (2014) find that myriad informal intraparty practices contribute to women’s lack of agency
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within the party after a quota law. Thus, quotas could lead to less attention to women’s policy
priorities:
H1b: Backlash effect: Quotas decrease party attention to women’s policy priorities.
I propose two alternative mechanisms through which quotas might shift policy priorities.
First, increased numbers of women might influence party agendas in several ways. A ‘critical
mass’ of women after a quota law could have more leverage to negotiate and push the party towards
their collective preferences (Kanter 1977). In a more gender-balanced environment, women may
feel more comfortable expressing ‘gendered’ preferences, and men more likely to be receptive
to their views. Mendelberg et al. (2013) find that as numbers of women increase so does their
authority, and that with a critical mass women begin discussing different issues (such as caring
responsibilities). Additional numbers of women could also influence party manifestos through their
ascent to positions of power within the party (O’Brien & Rickne 2016). Over time quotas are likely
to increase the number of female party leaders, who can then influence the content of the manifesto
more directly. Of course, an influx of women might also be more threatening to male politicians
than the status quo, leading them to resist women’s interests. Thus, the first potential mechanism
through which quotas influence policy priorities is indirect:
H2a: The effect of quota laws on policy priorities is mediated by the increase of women
in the parliamentary party.
The second way in which quotas can influence intra-party decisions is through changes
to expectations and norms about women in politics. Quota policies increase public awareness
and support for women in politics, which might cue party elites to prioritize women’s concerns.
Studies suggest that quotas attract media attention to (the lack of) women in politics (Sacchet 2008;
Sénac-Slawinski 2008). Rather than being an ‘one-off’ change, quotas tend to highlight the issue
of women in politics repeatedly at every subsequent election, with media coverage comparing how
parties are faring (which aren’t complying?) and who the female candidates are. For example,
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Portugal passed a quota law in 2006. In the most recent 2015 federal election – the third since
the quota law – national newspapers covered the share of female candidates and elected MPs,
referencing the 2006 law specifically. Some of the headlines include “Men continue to dominate
electoral lists. Only 25% of the 2015 heads of lists were women” (Espresso, 5 October 2015) and
“History was made. One-third of the seats will be occupied by women” (Observador, 5 October
2015). Media also paid particular attention to whether specific parties complied with the quota
requirements.3
Initial evidence suggests that quotas can lead the public to change their views about the
role of women in politics in a positive direction (Beaman et al. 2008; Burnet 2011), although I note
the need for more research in this area. Such shifts in media attention and public attitudes are likely
to affect the incentives and strategies of party leaders. Specifically, elites might use party manifestos
to associate the party with women’s policy concerns in order to raise their visibility on these issues
and claim credit from female constituents (Mayhew 1974). It is also possible that changing norms
are internalized by party elites themselves (coming to believe that more balanced representation is
normatively appropriate), regardless of electoral incentives. Because existing research fails to link
quota laws to negative public attitude or media shifts, I note that this mechanism is more likely
to explain a positive shift in party policies (salience effect) than a backlash. Thus, the second
mechanism through which quotas might affect policy agendas is direct:
H2b: The effect of quota laws on policy priorities is driven by the institution of the quota
law itself, rather than channelled through women.
Figure 1 presents a visual depiction of the argument, showing various predictions for how
direct or indirect mechanisms could link quota laws to party agendas. As the left column of the
figure shows, if the effect of a quota law is positive (salience), it could be due to direct or indirect
3Some examples are: “For the first time, the list of PSD / Azores has more women than men” (Publico, 16 June
2015), “List of PS in Santarem violates parity law” (Espresso, 28 August 2015), “Setúbal is the district with most
women elected as heads of lists” (Espresso, 6 October 2015).
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Party Response
Salience (+) Backlash (–)
Hypothesis 1a Hypothesis 1b
Mechanism
Direct (Law itself)
Hypothesis 2b
Increased public attn. Party can ignore law
cues parties to increase (no effect expected)
competition on women’s
issues
Indirect (Women)
Increased numbers of Increased numbers of
Hypothesis 2a
women represent women provoke adverse
women’s interests reaction among men
Figure 1: Predicted Effects of Quota Laws on Policy Priorities
mechanisms. A quota law, and the positive public attention it generates around women in politics,
could signal parties to increase competition on women’s issues (top left cell). Alternatively – or
additionally – the effect of quotas could be driven by increased numbers of women (bottom left
cell). The right column shows that if quota laws instead have a negative impact on women’s policy
priorities (backlash), the indirect mechanism is likely driving the effect. There is little reason to
believe that a quota law which does not disrupt party selection procedures or displace men would
lead to backlash. In this case, the party can simply ignore the law and no change in emphases
is expected (top right cell). A backlash is more likely to be precipitated by unwanted ‘shocks’ to
women in the party (bottom right cell).
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Data & Methods
The discussion so far suggests that we should see a relationship between quota laws and party
attention to women’s policy preferences. However, quota laws are not randomly assigned to
countries, and the concern for causal inference is that countries that adopt quota laws, or parties
that propose them, may be self-selecting based on some observable or nonobservable factors.
Endogeneity is possible at both country and party level. At the country level, countries that pass
quota laws might be characterized by different culture or attitudes towards women, which might
also influence party priorities. At the party level, similarly, parties that propose a successful quota
law might be characterized by different cultures and ideologies (for example they tend to be more
left-wing), and this could also influence subsequent priorities.
To deal with potential endogeneity at party level, I use statistical matching to pre-process
the data and match parties in countries that adopt a quota law to parties in countries with no quota
(Ho et al. 2007). The goal of matching is to reduce imbalance of potential confounders between
‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups (Stuart 2010). More balanced data more closely approximate data
that might have resulted from a randomized experiment, reducingmodel dependence and improving
the argument for causal inference (Ho et al. 2007; Imai, King & Stuart 2008; King &Nielsen 2016).
Because the units to be matched are panels rather than observations (i.e., parties and not party-
election-years), I use a procedure applied in previous studies using matched panel data (Simmons
& Hopkins 2005; Hollyer & Rosendorff 2012). For a party in a country that gets a quota law in
election-year t, I average observed covariates in all years prior to t. For all parties in countries that
do not qet a quota law, I average observed covaraties for all election-years available. Using this
compressed dataset, where the unit of observation is the party, I match parties that get a quota law to
parties that never get a quota law. Nearest-neighbor Malahanobis matching is employed, conducted
without replacement. This means that each pair consists of a party in a country that implements a
quota law, and a party in a country that does not. I then decompress the (cross-sectional) data, so
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that the unit of observation is again the party-election-year (time-series cross-sectional).
Using the pruned data set, I then employ a difference-in-difference approach by estimating
regression models that include both party- (which in linear combination are equal to country-) and
year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates measure the link between quota laws and priorities
within parties over time, relative to parties that do not get a quota law. The ‘treated’ group is
parties in countries that get a quota law and the ‘control’ is matched parties that do not get a quota
law. Fixed effects models control for any party or country-specific omitted variables (observable
and unobservable) that are constant over time – a potentially large source of omitted variable bias.
The difference-in-difference approach thus helps to address endogeneity concerns at the country
level, given the parallel trends assumption holds – that trends in policy priorities would have been
the same across parties and countries in the absence of a quota law. I test for the validity of this
assumption by estimating a dynamic panel model with leads and lags on quota implementation and
including unit-specific time trends. Additionally, I show that the results hold estimating the same
models using the full data set (without matching).
The baseline model with party and year fixed effects can be written as:
Yit = β1Quota Lawit + β2Zit + αi + ηt + µit
whereYit is the outcome of interest and measures party positions in party i in the year t; Quota Law
is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the implementation of a quota law and 0 otherwise, and β1 is
the coefficient for this main independent variable; Zit represents a vector of covariates, and β2 the
coefficients for these covariates; αi and ηt are party and year fixed effects, respectively; and µit is the
error term. All right-hand side variables are lagged by one election-year because party manifestos
are written before the election. I use robust standard errors clustered by election to address the
concern that unobserved election-specific factors may influence all parties’ policy priorities in a
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given election, leading to correlated errors among the parties standing in that election (Rogers
1994; Williams 2000).
I analyze party priorities using party manifestos data from the Comparative Manifesto
Project (MARPOR). MARPOR measures party positions on particular policy issues in the party’s
election-yearmanifesto. MARPORcodersmatch up ‘quasi-sentences’ (which can be a full sentence,
a clause, or a bullet point) in the manifesto with a category of policy. Each category is standardized
by taking the total number of quasi-sentences coded in the same document as a base. The resulting
percentage can be taken as a measure of the party’s policy priorities (Budge 2001; Klingemann
2006; Volkens et al. 2016). Manifestos are only coded in election years (observations are not
retained through the inter-election period).4
The full data set includes 132 parties in 21 countries from 1969 to 2011.5 The matched
data set is generated from this using the MatchIt package in R version 3.3.1 (Ho et al. 2011). To
specify the covariates to be used in matching, I consider how the adoption of quotas is related to
well-established determinants of policy priorities. The key issue is whether there is something else
that contributes to both a quota being adopted and a shift in policy priorities, e.g. an underlying
cultural norm shift in favor of women. I match on five variables potentially linked to quota laws and
party priorities: Women in Party, Party Family, Party Quota, Vote Share, and Year. The resulting
dataset consists of 20 ‘treated’ parties that get a quota, and 20 ‘control’ parties that do not, from
16 countries. The matching process reduces the multivariate imbalance statistic from 0.95 to 0.75,
significantly improving the balance of the sample. Technical details of the matching procedure, a
discussion of all variables used and considered for matching, and results on balance are reported in
Appendix A.
4The MARPOR data has been criticized by many scholars for how it estimates policy positions and scales the data
into L-R positions; however, because this paper evaluates change in relative policy emphasis over time (what the data
was originally intended for) these concerns are not as relevant (Gemenis 2013).
5The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United States.
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To operationalize the main dependent variables, I consider how existing data on party
priorities relates towomen’s policy concerns, asmeasured using survey data of gender gaps in policy
preferences. Women are more liberal and favor more government spending overall compared to
men across developed countries, even controlling for class and party (Svallfors 1997; Edlund &
Pande 2002; Huber & Stephens 2000; Lott & Kenny 1999; Iversen & Soskice 2001; Iversen &
Rosenbluth 2006; Barnes & Cassese 2017). Specifically, analysis of ISSP survey data finds large
gender gaps in preferences on the issues of maternal employment, government intervention, and
social spending (including healthcare, pensions, and unemployment), with women being more
progressive than men in advanced democracies. These gender gaps might derive from the decline
of marriage and corresponding higher rates of poverty for women over recent years, or because
of women’s increasing labor force participation (and associated need for affordable care services)
(Edlund & Pande 2002; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010). Similarly, analysis of survey data show that
women are more likely to support gender equality than men – e.g., to disagree with statements
like, ’a woman’s job is to look after the home’ (ISSP Family and Changing Gender Roles Survey)
(Weeks 2016). Accordingly, I would expect women’s preferences for social policies and gender
equality to be reflected more accurately after a quota law is passed.
The main dependent variables are the share of party manifesto devoted to threeMARPOR
policy categories capturing women’s preferences: 1) Social Justice; 2) Welfare State Expansion;
and 3) Left-Right Position. Social Justice includes any mention of social justice and the need for fair
treatment of all people, including the end of sex-based discrimination, as well as equality for other
under-privileged groups including race, class, sexuality, and disability. Welfare State Expansion
includes favorable mentions of the need to introduce, maintain, or expand any social service or
social security scheme, and support for social services such as child care, healthcare, retirement,
and unemployment benefits. Left-Right Position is the left-right position of party, as given in Lowe
et al. 2011’s log ratio scale (found to better reflect the importance a party attaches to policy areas
than the original composite version). According to the theory, we should expect political parties
14
to either increase (H1a) or decrease (H1b) the attention they devote to Social Justice and Welfare
State Expansion after a quota law is passed, and to move to the left (H1a) or right (H1b) on the
Left-Right Position.
The key independent variable is Quota Law, a binary variable coded “1” for parties in
countries which have a national quota law, after the law was implemented (including and after the
first election in which the quota was in operation). In my dataset, five countries have passed a
quota law: Italy (since repealed), Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal. It is important to note here
that, because quota laws are relatively recent and it was necessary to lag this variable, the parties
included in this study had a quota law for up to three consecutive election-years.6 Thus, the results
should be interpreted as short-term effects of a quota law.
Relevant covariates used in matching pre-processing are retained as controls in regres-
sion analysis (Vote Share and Party Quota).7 The fixed effects account for many time-invariant
confounders which would otherwise be included, including party family, electoral system, and
history of religious conservatism in a country. I also control for Log(GDP per capita) and Female
Labor Force Participation, both variables hypothesized to transform sex roles and attitudes towards
women as societies shift away from materialist values (Norris 1985; Inglehart & Norris 2000).
I control for Effective number of parties because party systems with a greater number of parties
might be more responsive to new issues than two-party systems (where there is less likely to be
competitive diffusion) (Matland & Studlar 1996; Kittilson 2011). Appendix B shows the summary
statistics for all parameters used in analysis, and provides details about data sources.
6In the matched data, of the 20 parties included that get a gender quota law, observations are included for all 20 in
the first election-year (year of implementation), 19 of the 20 in the first election-year after implementation, and 6 in the
second election-year after implementation.
7Note that Quota Law and Party Quota are not strongly correlated; the correlation coefficient is 0.26.
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Results and Discussion
Table 1 reports the results showing the effects of quota laws on party positions. The models in Table
1 control for omitted variable bias both across time and political parties, and should be interpreted
to estimate within-unit changes in treatment. The analysis uses matched data; analysis using the
full data set returns similar results and is available in Appendix D. I find no evidence for a backlash
effect (H1b); quotas do not significantly decrease attention to women’s policy concerns, nor do they
cause parties to move to the right. Providing some support for hypothesis 1a (salience effect), the
estimates imply that after a quota is implemented parties shift their positions on social justice, but
not welfare state expansion or left-right position. The coefficient of 5.6 on Quota Law indicates
that a one-unit change in Quota Law, i.e. going from not having a quota to implementing a quota,
is associated with a 5.6 percentage point increase in party attention to social justice. For example,
a party that devotes 5% of its manifesto to social justice (the mean) would be expected to spend
double the amount – 10.6% – of its manifesto on social justice issues after a quota law. Using
regression without matching, the effect of a quota law is slightly smaller (4% increase; see Table
D1 in Appendix D); although as previously discussed, because the matching results rely less on
untestable modelling assumptions (such as which parametric model to choose) I believe them to be
more credible (see Appendix A for more).
The coefficient estimates for Quota Law in Models 2 and 3, however, are not significant.
Parties that get a quota law are no more likely to prioritize welfare state expansion or shift left-right
direction than parties without a quota law.8 This suggests that quota laws do not lead parties to
change positions on more traditional issues like welfare, issues that have long been fundamental to
left-right politics (Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Allan & Scruggs 2004; Bartolini & Mair 2007; Benoit,
Laver et al. 2006). This finding aligns with evidence from Kittilson 2011, who demonstrates that
8In robustness checks, models using the original left-right score from the comparative manifesto data showed
similar results (quotas not statistically significant).
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Table 1: Effects of Quota Laws on Policy Priorities
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Welfare State Expansion Left-Right Position
(1) (2) (3)
Quota Law(t−1) 5.643∗∗∗ 1.596 0.430
(1.481) (2.374) (0.284)
Party Quota(t−1) 0.446 −0.277 0.113
(0.944) (1.173) (0.157)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) .085 0.179 0.002
(0.211) (0.232) (.028)
Vote Share(t−1) 0.011 −0.129∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.031) (0.055) (0.007)
Effective no. of parties(t−1) −0.134 0.079 0.160∗
(0.586) (0.652) (0.081)
Log(GDP per capita(t−1)) −10.864∗∗ −2.471 −0.230
(3.384) (4.147) (0.508)
Constant 105.961∗∗∗ 13.345 2.781
(30.129) (37.313) (4.672)
Observations 282 282 282
R2 0.651 0.551 0.736
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.357 0.621
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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the share of women in the party is a significant indicator of social justice mentions in the manifesto,
but not welfare state expansion.
As a robustness check, I estimate a dynamic panel model, which estimates the treatment
effect on social justice in the time periods before and after quota implementation (leads and lags).
Figure 2 plots the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a model including three leads and
two lags of the quota law variable (in addition to the full set of fixed effects and covariates). The
results show no ‘placebo’ effect before the law was implemented, strengthening the plausibility of
the parallel trends assumption and a causal interpretation of results. Recall that because manifestos
are written before the election, the first election-year in which quotas ought to have an impact is the
election after implementation, and reassuringly this is what the figure shows.9
The next hypotheses focus on the mechanisms driving the link between quotas and policy
priorities. Models 1 and 2 of Table 2 investigate whether women in the party accounts for the the
relationship between quotas and social justice policy (H2a), or the effect is instead direct (H2b).10
To investigate the indirect effect of increased women’s representation due to a quota law, I follow
Kenny and colleagues’ three steps for showing mediation effects (Baron & Kenny 1986; Judd &
Kenny 1981, 2010). These can be summarized as: 1) Show that the causal variable is correlated
with the outcome; 2) Show that the causal variable is correlated with the mediator; 3) For partial /
complete mediation, show that the effect of the causal variable on the outcome while controlling
for the mediator is reduced / zero.
9I also runmodels with party-specific time trends, which is an alternative way to test the robustness of the difference-
in-differences identification. When these trends are included, the identification relies on there being a sharp change
in the outcome at the date of treatment rather than an effect that grows gradually (Pischke 2005). I expect a more
gradual change as numbers of women and the salience of the law increases, and in fact the coefficient on quota law is
positive but no longer significant in this model (p = .2; Appendix D). While gradual changes are hard to pick up with
party-specific time trends, these results also suggest that it’s not possible to fully disentangle underlying trends from
the causal effect of quotas.
10Additional specifications (not shown to save space) looking at the dependent variables of Welfare State Expansion
and Left-Right Position returned no significant findings for mediation. I also investigated including women in party
leadership as a mediator. While Greene and O’Brien (2016) recently collected excellent data on gender and party
leadership, unfortunately there are large gaps in the data for many of the parties included here.
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Figure 2: Effect of Quota Laws on Social Justice Priorities
(Election-Years Before / After Quota Law Implemented)
Notes: Estimates with 95% confidence intervals (based on robust standard errors clustered by election) from dynamic
panel regression including party and year fixed effects and indicator variables for three leads and two lags (matched
data). Recall that because manifestos are written before the election, the first election-year in which quotas ought to
have an impact is the election after implementation, and this is what the figure shows.
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Table 2: Mediated Effects of Quota Laws on Policy Priorities
Dependent variable:
Women in Party(t−1) Social Justice
(1) (2)
Quota Law(t−1) −7.764. 5.674∗∗∗
(4.076) (1.487)
Women in Party(t−1) 0.004
(0.025)
Party Quota(t−1) 6.448∗∗ 0.419
(2.073) (0.999)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) 0.415 0.083
(0.391) (0.212)
Vote Share(t−1) 0.074 0.010
(0.106) (0.032)
Effective no. of parties(t−1) 0.091 −0.135
(1.074) (0.589)
Log(GDP per capita(t−1)) −.087 −0.108∗∗
(0.067) (0.034)
Constant 67.903 105.686∗∗∗
(62.278) (30.119)
Observations 282 282
R2 0.628 0.651
Adjusted R2 0.467 0.497
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Model 1 of Table 1 shows that the causal variable (Quota Law) is related to the outcome.
Yet Model 1 of Table 2 fails to provide evidence that the causal variable is correlated with the
mediator, Women in Party. The coefficient is negative although not statistically significant at the
conventional level (p = 0.07). I attribute this finding to both the short-term nature of this study
(recall that parties in this study had a quota law for up to only three consecutive election-years, and
most for two), and the structure of quota laws in these countries. For example, in France parties
notoriously shirked the quota for years because they could pay a fine instead (Fréchette, Maniquet
& Morelli 2008; Murray, Krook & Opello 2012; see also Schwindt-Bayer 2009). This is not due to
the lagged quota variable (which does not capture effects in the year of quota implementation); in
Appendix D I run models where the right-side variables are not lagged, and results do not change.
Model 1 of Table 2 suggests that, on average, the short-term effects of quotas on women within
parties in these countries were minimal.
The final step in mediation, Model 2 of Table 2, shows that the potential mediatorWomen
in Party is not a significant predictor of social justice emphasis, and its inclusion does not reduce
the size of the effect of Quota Law at all (compare to Model 1 of Table 1). Causal mediation
analysis using the potential outcomes framework (Imai, Keele & Tingley 2010), similarly, shows
no evidence of indirect effects.11 Additionally, I fit models including the variable Quota Impact,
defined as the change in women’s descriptive representation following quota implementation (rather
than a binary variable) (O’Brien & Rickne 2016). While the quota impact variable has a large range
(-40 to 50), the mean is close to zero (0.6), again suggesting that overall quotas in these countries
had minimal impact on women in the party. The coefficient on Quota Impact is close to zero and
not significant at conventional levels in these models (see Table D2 in Appendix D).
In line with Hypothesis 2b, this suggests that the (short-term) effect of quota laws is
direct, rather than channeled through increases of women in the party (Hypothesis 2a). The quota
11To estimate the mediated effects of women in the party on social justice policy positions, I use the mediation
package in R (results not shown to save space) Tingley et al. 2014.
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law itself cues parties to devote more attention to social justice issues. Given that quota laws were
not successful at increasing numbers of women in this sample of parties, it is no surprise that the
effect of quotas is not driven by women. Of course, over the long-term and as quota laws gain
stricter placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms, this could change. Overall, the results
here suggest that parties prioritize social justice after a quota whether the quota increases numbers
of women or not. This finding provides some of the first evidence that, as a gendered institution,
quotas affect party behavior independently of their influence on party demographics.
I take several steps to ensure that findings are not the result of model misspecification.
Robustness checks include estimating models that include a lagged dependent variable rather than
fixed effects, models that drop political parties responsible for proposing quota laws, and models
that exclude one country at a time to ensure results aren’t driven by a single country. My findings
are robust to these alternative specifications, which are presented in Appendix D to save space.
The Direct Effect of Quota Laws on Social Justice Emphasis
What can explain why quotas influence social justice priorities but not other issues that women
prefer, and what drives the effect if not women in the party? To unpack these findings, in this
section I propose a contagion mechanism driving the direct effect, whereby the quota law cues
parties to ramp up competition on gender issues. I provide initial evidence to support this theory
from statistical tests and interview data.
Welfare state expansion and overall left-right position are issues that structure the fun-
damental divide over politics in most countries, which is still typically class-based. Parties have
well-defined positions on these issues, and they might be particularly sticky given the constraints of
ideological reputation and issue ownership (Downs 1957; Budge, Robertson & Hearl 1987). The
issue of social justice for underprivileged groups (beyond class) has not traditionally structured
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party competition, and parties might therefore have more flexibility on this issue, particularly when
cued by events and changing public opinion to address it. Additionally, it could be easier for parties
to prioritize social justice policies that have smaller budgetary implications than welfare expansion.
The quota law, and subsequent related media coverage, thus could signal to parties that gender
equality is an important political issue and spur further competition on comparatively flexible and
’cheap’ gendered policies.
Past studies have demonstrated a similar type of ‘contagion’, where parties shift policies
in order to respond to pressures from other parties and the electorate, including specifically on the
issue of gender quotas (e.g., Kolinsky 1991;Matland& Studlar 1996; Kittilson 2006). One example
is further legislation on gender quotas. In author interviews with party leaders and politicians in
Belgium, the 2011 law adopting gender quotas for boards of listed and state-owned companies was
frequently brought up across parties as a specific example of how quota laws shifted the political
agenda.12 Support for the 2011 quota law was widespread, backed by parties across the left and
mainstream right. One plausible reason for this is that the initial quota law garners sympathetic
media support over time. It establishes a norm in gender equality that paves the way for similar
arguments in another sector (Meier 2013). One politician commented that, “We will win in public
opinion because the media writes in favor of us. And that is different also because in the past they
weren’t supportive of us, but now there are more women in the media also.”13 A minister’s adviser
in Belgium commented that her country was also supporting EU-level board quotas (the Reding
Directive), while many countries with high levels of women (but no quota law; e.g., Sweden)
were opposing it. “I think France and Belgium and the countries with the quota law are the ones
supporting it,” she said.14 While this is just one example of how quotas can shift policy priorities,
it highlights the potential role of a norm shift, media support, and public opinion in driving parties
12Els Van Hoof, personal interview, 16 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium; Niki Dheedene, personal interview, 8
October 2013, Brussels, Belgium; Viviane Teitelbaum, personal interview, 23 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium;
Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
13Els Van Hoof, personal interview, 16 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
14Niki Dheedene, personal interview, 8 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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to prioritize equality issues after a quota law.
We might expect contagion particularly among parties of the left, due to increasing
competition on gender equality promotion with the rise of ‘New Left’ parties (Caul 1999; Keith &
Verge 2016). In Appendix C, I consider whether party ideology conditions the effects of a quota
law. The effect of a quota law on social justice positions is larger for left parties (the coefficient
increases to 6.9, compared to 4.4 for right parties), although the interaction between quota and party
ideology is not statistically significant. Similarly, I consider whether effects might be moderated
by whether the party has an internal quota provision; perhaps those parties with voluntary quotas
are exactly the ones likely to ramp up competition on gender issues after the quota law. I find
some borderline significant evidence of this in Appendix C; the interaction is significant at the 0.1
level. The coefficient for parties with voluntary quotas is 7 compared to 4.6 for those without such
provisions (very similar to left and right parties). These tests suggest that effects are partially driven
by progressive parties which already compete on gender equality issues.
While progressive parties might see a quota as a signal to ramp up competition on gender
equality, parties that did not support the law might feel an added incentive to develop their positions
addressing women’s interests in order to compensate for past opposition. One interesting finding
from the robustness checks is that the effect of quota laws on social justice emphasis is slightly
larger when parties that proposed the quota law are excluded (the coefficient for quota law is 5.92
for this sample compared to 5.65 in the original sample). This is consistent with the idea that parties
are over-compensating for quota opposition after the fact by paying more attention to ‘women’s
issues’. In short, the contagion mechanism applies across parties – evidence suggests it might be
slightly larger for those who already compete on gender issues (those with an internal quota), but
that it also holds for right parties and those that did not support a law. The results can be interpreted
as cross-party evidence for quota ‘contagion’ in priorities, although not necessarily restricted to the
expansion of quotas alone. Because the category of social justice is broader than quotas or gender
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equality, additional research is necessary to understand exactly how quotas affect the variety of
social justice policies.
Conclusion
This article examines the impact of quota laws on party positions in advanced democracies. It finds
that parties in countries with gender quota laws increase the attention they give to social justice.
Gender quota laws increase coverage of social justice issues even after using statistical matching
to reduce concerns about endogeneity, including party and year fixed effects, and controlling for
time-varying potential confounders. The findings reject the notion that quotas have a backlash
effect, and generally support the theory of a salience effect. The effect of a quota is driven directly
by the institution of the law itself, rather than by associated increases in numbers of women. I
interpret these results as evidence for quota-driven ‘contagion’ on equality. At least in the short
term, quotas affect party positions by cueing party leaders to compete on gender equality.
The findings are important for three main reasons. First, gender quotas are increasingly
being introduced in countries across the world. This study confirms that quota laws are an effective
tool to increase women’s substantive representation at an important stage of the policymaking
process: agenda-setting. Quotas can expand the scope of decision-making beyond standard issues
of importance to dominant groups. Yet the question of whether party priorities translate into policy
outcomes remains. The quotation from Belgian politician Viviane Teitelbaum at the start of this
paper – the gender equality chapter goes in the party program, but no one in the party reads it
– leaves room for doubt. And does the public discern these shifts? Some research finds that
there is lingering public doubt about whether parties will fulfill their campaign promises (Naurin
2011). A natural extension of this work is to explore the effects of quotas on public opinion, such
as survey data about which party is best able to handle social justice concerns, and actual policy
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outcomes, such as legislation and spending on issues related to social justice policies (e.g., Clayton
& Zetterberg 2018).
The findings also suggest caution in interpreting the potential scope of quotas’ effects
across policy areas. National quota legislation is an effective mechanism for increasing women’s
substantive representation within parties, but only on issues directly related to equality. I find no
evidence that quotas lead to changes on important, ‘sticky’ issues at the core of a party’s identity:
welfare policy or overall left-right position. The second key implication is that not all women’s
interests are alike. The translation of women’s policy demands into outcomes depends on how
those demands map onto traditional (class-based) political cleavages, or perhaps how costly they
are to implement.
Finally, this research has potential implications beyond gender quotas, adding to the
growing evidence that gender-related institutions can have significant impacts on policy agendas and
outcomes that warrant further exploration (Kittilson 2010). To the best of the author’s knowledge,
this is the first study to find a direct effect of quota laws on party priorities. The results complement
work that shows women in the party matter (Kittilson 2011; Greene & O’Brien 2016), suggesting
that the imposition of a quota law itself can also have spillover effects on other policies. More
research is needed to test the contagion mechanism proposed here, and the conditions under which
party leaders respond to women’s policy preferences. Future studies might dig deeper into these
questions through more fine-grained text analysis of manifestos, media analysis before and after
quota implementation, and interviews with key actors in the manifesto creation process.
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Appendix for “Quotas and Party Priorities: Direct and Indirect
Effects of Quota Laws”
The following Appendix includes supplementary information on (A) the matching procedure, (B)
summary statistics, (C) potential moderators, and (D) robustness checks.
A. Details of Matching Procedure
In this section, I describe the selection of fivematching variables that might influence the probability
of adopting a quota law and party priorities, as well as other variables considered for matching,
technical details of the matching process, and diagnostics of the matching procedure.
First, most of the countries that pass quota laws are characterized by low levels of women’s
representation before the law is passed. The percentage of women in parliament is also perhaps
the best proxy available for attitudes towards women in politics (see e.g., Norris 1985), a potential
confounder that is very difficult to measure over time. Greater shares of women in political parties
are also associated with shifts in party agendas (Kittilson 2011).
Relatedly, left parties are more likely to prioritize women and gender equality – including
support for quota laws – than are right parties (Kittilson 2006; Keith & Verge 2016). I thus match
on party family to ensure that the parties being compared are similar in ideology. The party family
variable also helps to control for international policy diffusion, since similar parties often have close
ties to each other across countries which affect both the likelihood of quota adoption and party
priorities (Krook 2006, 2008). Third, previous experience with voluntary gender quotas within
the party system is likely to increase the chances of a quota law being adopted in that country
(Henig 2002; Matland 2005), and potentially also shift party emphasis by increasing numbers of
women. Finally, I match on both vote share and year to control for party size and time trends, both
1
of which could be related to women’s opportunities in politics and party priorities. For example,
smaller, niche parties might be more likely to take up special issues like equality because they are
not constrained by a history of emphasizing traditional left-right issues (Kittilson 2011).
I considered matching on other potential confounders. Research has highlighted the
importance of strong women’s movements advocating for change, especially women’s sections in
the party (Kittilson 2006; Dahlerup 2006). Unfortunately it is very difficult to measure the presence
or strength of women’s movements or party sections across countries over time. Data on the
existence of women’s sections over time do not exist for my sample of parties. Htun and Weldon
(2012) provide valuable data on the strength and autonomy of feminist women’s movements over
time in 70 countries. However, as noted in the text, women’s movements are not considered to be
a significant factor in quota adoption in the countries I study, save for the case of France. Indeed,
the Htun and Weldon data show that there was no change in the strength or autonomy of women’s
movements in Belgium, France, and Portugal before a quota law was passed. In the remaining two
countries, Italy and Spain, the strength of feminist women’s movements actually declined before
the quota law passed (autonomy remained the same). In summary, the evidence suggests that a
trend towards strong, autonomous women’s movements is not present before quota laws are passed
in these countries.
While Iwould ideally like tomatch on other underlying party- and country- characteristics,
a larger number of covariateswill increase the distance between units in the covariate space, meaning
matched pairs will be generally further apart (Nielsen & Sheffield 2012). However, I do adjust for
other variables in the post-matching regression analysis, namely: female labor force participation
and GDP per capita (both linked to attitudes towards women, like the matching variable women in
the party).
I use nearest neighbor, Mahalanobis matching. Nearest neighbor matching selects the
single best control match for each ‘treated’ unit (i.e., party in a country that passes a quota law).
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Matching is done using a distance measure, and here the Mahalanobis option is used because it
allows for continuous covariates (Ho et al. 2011). I use exact matching for party family, as ideology
is perhaps the most important identifying characteristic of a party. The matched data thus allow us
to compare how quotas affect party priorities across similar types of parties, broadly speaking. The
rest of the matches are selected based on Mahalanobis distance (for technical details, see Rubin
1973).
The matching process reduced the multivariate imbalance statistic from 0.95 to 0.75,
significantly improving the balance of the sample. Graphical diagnostics of the matching procedure
are reported below in Figure A1. Figure A1 displays quantile-quantile (QQ) plots, which plot the
distribution of the covariates amongst countries that implemented (‘Treated Units’, on the y-axis)
and did not implement (‘Control’ Units, on the x-axis) a gender quota law. The closer the plot
lies to the 45-degree line, the greater the confidence that treated and control samples are drawn
from the same distribution (balanced). On inspection, four out of five matched covariate plots are
closer to the 45-degree line than the full data sample. The plot for party quota ("lag1.partyquota")
does not indicate significant improvement, but the matched sample appears no worse than the full
data sample (in fact, the summary statistics indicate 19% balance improvement for the party quota
variable in the matched data). The QQ-plots thus demonstrate that matching produces good balance
on these covariates overall. Because the matched data is more balanced on covariates than the full
data set, treatment and control units are more comparable and modelling assumptions (such as
which parametric model to use) have less influence on the results of analysis (King & Zeng 2006b;
Ho et al. 2007). As Nielsen and Sheffield (2009) point out, model dependence is especially likely
when observations that have different values on the key variable of interest (here, quota law) also
have very different values on other variables.
Table A1 below shows the matched pairs resulting from the matching procedure.
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Figure A1: Quantile-Quantile Plots
Notes: The "parfam" variable is party family categorization from the comparative manifesto data, "year" is
the election-year, "lag1.pervote" is the vote share of the party lagged by one election-year, "lag1.partyquota"
is an indicator variable for whether the party had a voluntary internal quota, lagged by one election year, and
"lag1.pfemnew”istheshareo fwomenintheparliamentaryparty, laggedbyoneelection − year .
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Table A1: Matched pairs
Party affected by quota law Matched party
1 Belgium Ecologists Italy Green Federation
2 Belgium Flemish Socialist Party Italy Italian Socialist Party
3 Belgium Francophone Socialist Party Ireland Labour Party
4 Belgium Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats Belgium Liberal Reformation Party
5 Belgium Christian Democratic and Flemish Italy Christian Democrats
6 Belgium Christian Social Party Norway Christian People’s Party
7 Belgium Flemish Bloc Spain Basque Left
8 France French Communist Party Japan Japanese Communist Party
9 France Socialist Party Canada New Democratic Party
10 France Democratic Movement Sweden Moderate Coalition Party
11 Spain United Left Italy Communist Refoundation Party
12 Spain Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany
13 Spain Popular Alliance Australia Liberal Party of Australia
14 Spain Convergence and Union New Zealand First Party
15 Spain Basque Nationalist Party Spain Aragonese Regionalist Party
16 Spain Canarian Coalition Finland Swedish People’s Party
17 Portugal Portuguese Communist Party Greece Communist Party of Greece
18 Portugal Socialist Party United Kingdom Labour Party
19 Portugal Social Democratic Party New Zealand Labour Party
20 Portugal Social Democratic Center - Popular Party Japan Clean Government Party
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B. Summary Statistics for Data Used in Analysis
The following tables present summary statistics for both the matched data set (Table B1) and the full
data set used formatching (TableB2). Social Justice,Welfare StateExpansion,Vote Share, andRight
Party come from theComparativeManifesto Project (Manifesto ProjectMRG/MARPOR/MARPOR)
Version 2016b (Volkens et al. 2016). Right Party includes the parties categorized by MARPOR
as Liberal, Christian Democrat, Conservative, or Ethnic and Regional. Left-Right Position comes
from Lowe et al. 2011’s log ratio scale. ♀ Labor Force Participation comes from OECD Labour
Statistics (2017). Effective no. parties comes from the Comparative Political Data Set, CPDS 2014
(Armingeon et al. 2014), and GDP per capita comes from the Comparative Welfare States Data
Set, 2014 (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014). Women in Party comes from Greene and O’Brien
(2016), supplemented by original data collection. Original data for a subset of parties / countries
was collected using parliamentary websites, secondary literature, and newspapers, particularly for
recent election-years. Original data for Party Quota, a binary variable, was compiled using party
documents, secondary literature, and correspondence with political party representatives.
Table B1: Summary Statistics, Matched Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Social Justice 282 5.166 4.400 0.000 23.100
Welfare State Expansion 282 8.699 5.384 0.000 31.381
Left-Right Position 282 −0.406 0.863 −2.944 1.790
Quota Law(t−1) 282 0.089 0.285 0 1
Quota Impact(t-1) 282 0.620 0.336 -40 50
Party Quota(t−1) 282 0.191 0.394 0 1♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) 282 40.86 4.604 26.65 48.42
Vote Share(t−1) 282 18.147 13.636 0.000 51.287
Effective no. parties(t−1) 282 3.811 1.959 1.690 9.080
GDP per capita(t−1) 282 20,465.370 6,651.328 7,072.481 42,817.280
Women in Party(t−1) 282 14.228 13.502 0.000 97.000
Right Party 282 0.450 0.498 0 1
Looking at the differences between matched and unmatched data (Tables B1 and B2), the
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Table B2: Summary Statistics, Full Data Set
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Social Justice 837 5.124 4.843 0.000 32.300
Welfare State Expansion 837 7.984 6.188 0.000 58.333
Left-Right Position 837 −0.252 1.046 −4.779 3.476
Quota Law(t−1) 837 0.035 0.183 0 1
Quota Impact(t-1) 837 0.193 0.114 -40 50
Party Quota(t−1) 837 0.140 0.347 0 1
Vote Share(t−1) 837 19.541 14.618 0.000 56.668♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) 837 41.74 4.738 26.65 48.42
Effective no. of parties(t−1) 837 3.853 1.550 1.690 9.080
GDP per capita(t−1) 837 22,382.160 7,830.571 7,072.481 66,411.240
Women in Party(t−1) 837 19.638 17.046 0.000 100.000
Right Party 837 0.556 0.497 0 1
samples are similar in many respects: e.g., attention to social justice, left-right position, vote share.
The matched sample is characterized by lower levels of women’s representation, development, and
female labor force participation, which fits well with what we know about determinants of quota
adoption in advanced democracies (and share of women in the party before a quota was a variable
used in matching). The average attention to welfare state expansion is also higher in the matched
data, which makes sense if these countries have on average lower levels of welfare spending. These
differences highlight that in terms of external validity, the scope of implications of this research
is somewhat limited by the types of countries that tend to adopt quota laws. For example, a
counterfactual ‘control’ country that comes up often in the matching process is Italy (see Table A1,
Appendix A).
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C. Potential Moderators
Below I consider whether party ideology and party quotas condition the effects of a quota law.
Model 1 of Table C1 tests this by including an interaction between Quota Law and Right Party in
the baseline specification (Model 1 of Table 1). The variable Right Party is a binary variable that
codes as 1 parties characterized by MARPOR as Liberal, Christian Democrat, Conservative, or
Ethnic and Regional; coded as 0 are left-wing Ecological, Socialist, and Social Democratic parties.
Note that the constitutive term for Right Party cannot be included in the model due to the inclusion
of party-level fixed effects, but it is fully accounted for in the fixed effects.
The coefficient on the interaction term in Model 1 of Table C1 is negative, but not
statistically significant. The coefficient on Quota Law increases in size to 6.9, and can now be
interpreted as the effect of a quota law on social justice priorities among left parties. This suggests
that the effect of a quota law on social justice priorities is larger for left parties, although the
difference between left and right parties is not statistically significant.1 These results suggest no
evidence that quota effects are conditioned by party ideology.
Figure C1 visually depicts the relationship between quota laws, party ideology, and social
justice. The figure plots the estimated coefficient for social justice against party ideology (left
and right). Moving from a right to left party increases the effect of a quota law by 2 and a
half percentage points, although the confidence intervals clearly overlap. I interpret this result as
evidence for increased party competition over gendered policies after a quota across parties.
1As a robustness check, I also fit a model including an interaction between Quota Law andWomen in Party, which
is not significant at conventional levels (in line with previous results).
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Table C1: Moderated Effects of Quota Laws on Policy Priorities
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Social Justice
(1) (2)
Quota Law(t−1) 6.951∗∗∗ 4.603∗∗
(2.048) (1.604)
Quota Law(t−1)× Right Party −2.489
(2.292)
Party Quota(t−1) 0.423 −0.047
(0.947) (0.835)
Quota Law(t−1)× Party Quota(t−1) 2.439.
(1.277)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) 0.105 0.849
(0.215) (2.100)
Vote Share(t−1) 0.013 0.011
(0.031) (0.031)
Effective no. of parties(t−1) −0.142 −0.162
(0.582) (3.39)1
Log(GDP per capita(t−1)) −0.108∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.013)
Constant 104.434∗∗∗ 106.838∗∗∗
(30.190) (24.289)
Observations 282 282
R2 0.657 0.655
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.504
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Figure C1: Predicted Change in Social Justice as a Function of Quota Law and Party Type
Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown inModel 1 of Table C1. The units on the x-axis represent
left and right parties, and the units on the y-axis represent percentage point change in party attention to social justice.
I also consider whether having a voluntary party quota conditions the effects of a quota
law. Model 2 of Table C2 includes an interaction between Quota Law and Party Quota. The
coefficient on the interaction term in Model 2 of Table C1 is positive, and borderline statistically
significant (p = 0.06). The coefficient on Quota Law decreases to 4.6, and can now be interpreted
as the effect of a quota law on social justice among parties with no party level quotas. Figure C2
shows the predicted change in social justice emphasis as a function of quota law and party quotas,
and it shows that for parties with an internal quota the size of effect increases to about 7. This
suggests that the effect of a quota law on social justice emphasis is larger for parties with a party
quota, although again confidence intervals overlap. These results suggest that quota effects are
partially driven by parties with internal quotas, although effects still exist for parties without these
provisions.
Another way of exploring heterogeneous treatment effects is looking for differences across
10
Figure C2: Predicted Change in Social Justice as a Function of Quota Law and Party Quota
Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown inModel 2 of Table C1. The units on the x-axis represent
parties with and without internal party quotas, and the units on the y-axis represent percentage point change in party
attention to social justice.
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countries. While I confirm that results hold while dropping each country sequentially from the
data set (Appendix D), I also ran a model including interactions between the quota law variable
and country dummies. None of these interactions were significant, indicating that the effect is not
driven by one country in particular.
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D. Robustness checks
This section includes the results of robustness checks to ensure that findings are not the result
of model misspecification. First, I show results from the main specifications (Table 1) using the
full, unmatched data set (Table D1). Table D2 presents results from regressions that use the
Quota Impact variable, defined as the change in women’s descriptive representation following
quota implementation (rather than a binary variable). Table D3 presents models using a lagged
dependent variable, which accounts for autocorrelation, rather than fixed effects.2 In Table D4
I specify models that include no control variables (but retaining fixed effects), and in Table D5
models that lag all control variables by 2 election-years, to account for potential post-treatment bias
(King & Zeng 2006a).
Table D6 presents results using data where the political parties that were responsible for
proposing quota laws are removed from the dataset. These are: the Flemish Social Democrats
(SPA) and the Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD & V) in Belgium, the Democratic Party
of the Left in Italy, the Socialist Party in France, the Socialist Workers’ Party in Spain, and the
Socialist Party in Portugal. Many of the parties that remain in the sample did not support a quota
law and indeed campaigned and voted against it. I make the claim that because the quota law was
imposed on these parties without their support, we can view it as a plausibly exogenous source of
change in the political atmosphere and numbers of women required for the remaining parties. I find
that results do not change; in fact, the size of effects is slightly larger when parties that proposed
the quota law are excluded (e.g., the coefficient for quota law is 5.92 for this sample compared to
5.65 in the original sample). One interpretation of these results is that parties that did not support
a quota law are over-compensating after the fact by paying more attention to ‘women’s issues’.
Table D7 presents results from regression where all right-side variables are not lagged.
2Including both a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects is not recommended because it requires much more
demanding conditions for consistent estimation (Angrist & Pischke 2008, 245-6).
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One concern might be that the lagged quota law variable does not capture the effects of quota laws
on women’s representation in the first election of implementation, and this might be where we
ought to expect the largest shifts. This might bias effects of quota laws downwards. To address this
concern I estimate models of main results which include measures of quota law and covariates that
are not lagged. Table D7 shows that results hold in these models; quota laws are not associated
with a short-term increase in women’s representation at the party level, and quota laws still have
an effect on social justice emphasis, although it is decreased and borderline statistically significant.
Because manifestos are written before elections, I prefer the main specifications in text for ease of
interpretation.
This result is somewhat unexpected, since most research shows that quota laws increase
women’s representation at the national level (Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010; Hughes 2011; Paxton
& Hughes 2015, but see Hughes 2009). Still, an important finding is that policy design matters;
higher thresholds, placement mandates, and strict enforcement mechanisms have been shown to
enhance quota effectiveness (Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Both France and Portugal fine parties rather
than require compliance to run candidates. While the Spanish law requires compliance for list
submission, representation in Spain was high before the law, and research has illustrated that
parties get around it in creative ways (Esteve-Volart & Bagues 2012). Differences between findings
using party and national level data could be attributed to the context of these countries (weak laws),
and might also suggest that smaller, less electorally-relevant parties in particular are not complying.
Table D8 presents results from tests of the common trends assumption; Model 1 includes
leads and lags of quota implementation and Model 2 includes party-specific time trends. Model
1 is reassuring in that it shows no ‘placebo’ effect of the quota law before we ought to expect it
to impact social justice priorities. In Model 2 the results do change: the coefficient on quota law
decreases to 1.38 and p-value increases to .21. While gradual changes are hard to pick up with
party-specific time trends (the assumption here is a sharp change at implementation), these results
14
also suggest that it’s not possible to fully disentangle underlying trends from the causal effect of
quotas.
In other tests not shown here but available from author, I ran country fixed effects instead
of party fixed effects, and included linear and nonlinear time trends. The results do not change.
Finally, I exclude one country at a time and re-estimate specifications, to ensure that results are
not driven by factors specific to a single country. My findings are robust to these alternative
specifications. While some countries are found to be more influential than others – for example,
estimates of the impact of quota law on social justice decrease when Belgium, the country which
has had a quota law the longest, is excluded from the sample – the estimates for quota law remain
positive and significant upon elimination of any country from the sample.
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Table D1: Regression Results, Full Data Set
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Welfare State Expansion Left-Right Position
(1) (2) (3)
Quota Law(t−1) 4.174∗∗∗ 0.439 −0.034
(0.952) (1.585) (1.585)
Party Quota(t−1) 1.720∗∗∗ −0.643 0.174
(0.497) (0.882) (0.882)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) 25.915∗ 9.082 −0.431
(13.093) (14.769) (14.769)
Vote Share(t−1) −0.009 −0.002 0.002
(0.023) (0.037) (0.037)
Effective no. of parties(t−1) 0.266 −0.540 0.124∗
(0.414) (0.434) (0.434)
Log(GDP per capita(t−1)) −0.075∗ −0.066∗ 0.001
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant 67.637∗∗∗ 64.645∗∗ −1.799
(24.632) (26.698) (26.698)
Observations 837 837 837
R2 0.517 0.462 0.706
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.318 0.627
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Table D2: Regression Results, Using ‘Quota Impact’ Variable
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Welfare State Expansion Left-Right Position
(1) (2) (3)
Quota Impact(t−1) 0.030 0.005 −0.001
(0.040) (0.056) (0.002)
Party Quota(t−1) 0.842 −0.162 0.145
(0.932) (1.157) (0.153)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) 0.117 0.188 0.004
(0.226) (0.230) (0.029)
Vote Share(t−1) 0.000 −0.132∗ 0.018∗
(0.031) (0.054) (0.007)
Effective no. of parties(t−1) −0.168 0.069 0.157.
(0.574) (0.658) (0.083)
Log(GDP per capita(t−1)) −12.268∗∗∗ −2.87 −0.345
(3.519) (4.005) (0.493)
Constant 117.367∗∗∗ 16.745 3.777
(33.016) (35.916) (4.600)
Observations 282 282 282
R2 0.63 0.550 0.732
Adjusted R2 0.469 0.355 0.616
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Table D3: Regression Results, with LDV (no FE)
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Welfare State Expansion Left-Right Position
(1) (2) (3)
Quota Law(t−1) 1.913∗∗∗ 0.777 −0.214
(0.561) (1.384) (0.13)
Party Quota(t−1) 0.849∗ 0.648 −0.124
(0.482) (0.750) (0.089)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) −0.012 0.094 0.011
(0.066) (0.090) (0.010)
Vote Share(t−1) −0.013 −0.008 0.008∗∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.002)
Effective no. of parties(t−1) −0.021 0.188 0.029
(0.112) (0.188) (0.021)
Log(GDP per capita(t−1)) −1.257 0.495 0.013
(1.031) (1.010) (0.214)
LDV 0.562∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.067) (0.047)
Constant 88.615∗∗∗ −4.463 −0.992
(31.009) (9.298) (1.805)
Observations 282 282 282
R2 0.343 0.268 0.515
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.249 0.503
Year fixed effects No No No
Party fixed effects No No No
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Table D4: Regression Results, No Control Variables (FE Retained)
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Welfare State Expansion Left-Right Position
(1) (2) (3)
Quota Law(t−1) 6.820∗∗∗ 2.174 0.452
(1.800) (2.203) (0.279)
Constant 11.856∗∗∗ −2.264 1.608∗∗∗
(2.476) (2.383) (0.332)
Observations 282 282 282
R2 0.620 0.536 0.718
Adjusted R2 0.468 0.351 0.607
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Table D5: Regression Results, Lagging Control Variables by 2 Election-Years
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Welfare State Expansion Left-Right Position
(1) (2) (3)
Quota Law(t−1) 5.652∗∗ 1.023 0.361
(1.932) (2.427) (0.328)
Party Quota(t−2) −0.278 −0.979 0.329∗∗
(0.797) (1.372) (0.121)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−2) 0.436 0.022 1.184
(2.555) (2.788) (0.359)
Vote Share(t−2) 0.011 −0.125∗ 0.010
(0.028) (0.061) (0.007)
Effective no. of parties(t−2) −0.398 0.353 −0.072
(0.668) (0.963) (0.082)
Log(GDP per capita(t−2)) −9.309∗∗ −0.803 0.178
(3.125) (5.077) (0.550)
Constant 88.615∗∗∗ 12.403 −0.483
(31.009) (48.226) (5.250)
Observations 249 249 249
R2 0.637 0.583 0.742
Adjusted R2 0.455 0.373 0.613
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Table D6: Regression Results, Excluding Parties that Proposed a Quota
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Welfare State Expansion Left-Right Position
(1) (2) (3)
Quota Law(t−1) 5.917∗∗∗ 1.868 0.397
(1.427) (2.465) (0.289)
Party Quota(t−1) −1.108 −0.634 0.103
(1.057) (1.812) (0.214)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) .144 0.228 −0.001
(0.209) (0.248) (.030)
Vote Share(t−1) −0.023 −0.208∗∗ 0.020∗
(0.047) (0.069) (0.010)
Effective no. of parties(t−1) −0.400 −0.103 0.213∗
(0.539) (0.809) (0.088)
Log(GDP per capita(t−1)) −12.341∗∗∗ −2.036 0.115
(3.649) (4.598) (0.545)
Constant 117.613∗∗∗ 8.682 −0.483
(33.092) (41.361) (4.579)
Observations 242 242 242
R2 0.671 0.551 0.746
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.328 0.619
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Table D7: Regression Results, Covariates not Lagged
Dependent variable:
%Women in Party Social Justice
(1) (2)
Quota Law −3.221 1.838∗
(2.433) (0.983)
Party Quota 5.956∗∗∗ −0.058
(1.742) (0.850)♀ Labor Force Part. 0.664 0.253
(0.387) (0.213)
Vote Share 0.183∗ −0.080∗
(0.092) (0.042)
Effective no. of parties 1.208 −1.126∗∗
(0.797) (0.567)
Log(GDP per capita) −4.825 −11.375∗∗∗
(5.941) (3.579)
Constant 24.790 109.567∗∗∗
(55.398) (33.619)
Observations 282 282
R2 0.759 0.638
Adjusted R2 0.654 0.481
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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Table D8: Regression Results, Tests of Common Trends
Dependent variable:
Social Justice Social Justice
Quota Law(t−2) 6.277∗∗∗
(1.950)
Quota Law(t−1) 4.698∗∗ 1.381
(1.972) (1.102)
Quota Law −1.059
(1.207)
Quota Law(t+1) 0.080
(1.497)
Quota Law(t+2) 1.182
(1.467)
Quota Law(t+3) −0.580
(1.729)
Party Quota(t−1) 0.020 0.235
(0.741) (0.398)♀ Labor Force Part.(t−1) 0.158 −0.105∗
(0.211) (0.043)
Vote Share(t−1) 0.006 0.019
(0.029) (0.647)
Effective no. of parties(t−1) −0.200 −0.225
(0.656) (0.753)
Log(GDP per capita)(t−1)) −11.094∗∗∗ −11.210∗∗∗
(3.513) (0.341)
Constant 104.984∗∗∗ −324.993
(30.777) (584.659)
Observations 282 282
R2 0.667 0.718
Adjusted R2 0.510 0.502
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes
Party-specific time trends No Yes
.p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Note: Robust standard errors clustered around election in parentheses.
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